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Market 51.5% against model 60.6%. Resolves in 50d 2h, data updated 1d ago.
Decision layer
The model disagreement survives the current gates. This is still research context, not financial advice.
Expected value after costs, not raw probability spread.
How much support the model sees across available inputs.
Thin markets can erase apparent edge through spread and slippage.
Resolution ambiguity, timing, and data quality pressure the decision.
Why / why not trade
This public box mirrors the internal diagnostic style without exposing execution controls: decision, probability gap, cost-adjusted edge, blocker, and next thing to monitor.
side YES
60.6% model / 51.5% market
fees, spread, slippage, risk
Model edge survives the current public research gates.
Watch whether the market price moves toward or away from the model.
Model 60.6% vs market 51.5%.
Raw disagreement is reduced by fees, spread, slippage, and risk controls.
Model leans YES
The model-market gap currently survives the decision gates, but it is still research context and must be judged against the public track record.
Sign in to return to this exact question, review governed evidence, and record an append-only probability without exposing private thesis text.
usable feature coverage.
Volume $251,978
The model estimates a 9-point higher probability than the market, primarily driven by historical base rate.
| FACTOR | SIGNAL | WEIGHT | LOG-ODDS ΔLog-odds contribution measures how much each factor shifted the model's probability estimate in log-odds space — the mathematically correct way to stack independent evidence. Formula: Δlog-odds = weight × signal. Positive values push the probability up; negative values push it down. Log-odds are converted back to probability via the logistic function at the end. | DIRECTION | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Historical base rate | 63% | — | +0.515 | Bullish | Historical frequency for this kind of event — the prior before any market-specific evidence. |
| Cross-market divergence | This factor was not available for this market. No approved cross-venue link exists for this market. |
No comparable events matched for this market.
On June 22, the first round of U.S.-Iran diplomatic talks in Switzerland concluded, with mediators reporting progress toward a roadmap for a final deal and follow-on technical talks expected to continue.(see: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/22/us-iran-agree-on-roadmap-towards-final-deal-in-switzerland-talks). This market will resolve to “Yes” if the next formal senior-level round of peace talks between representatives of the United States and Iran begins by the listed date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying round must be a deliberate in-person diplomatic meeting or negotiating round concerning US-Iran relations, involving senior representatives of both the United States and Iran who are acting in an official capacity and are authorized to conduct or materially direct diplomacy on behalf of their governments. Indirect in-person diplomacy through designated mediators, facilitators, or interlocutors will qualify, provided senior representatives of both the United States and Iran are participating in the same formal diplomatic process with the knowledge and authorization of their respective governments. The representatives need not be in the same room at the same time. Follow-on technical talks from the June 22 Switzerland round will not qualify by themselves. Technical, staff-level, working-group, implementation, monitoring, preparatory, or deconfliction meetings will not qualify unless they occur as part of a new formally convened senior-level U.S.-Iran peace-talks round. Brief greetings, chance encounters, photo opportunities, ceremonial appearances, or talks not deliberately aimed at diplomacy or negotiation will not count. The meeting must be in-person (including indirect in-person meetings) and must be publicly acknowledged by either government or reported by a consensus of credible media. Remote meetings, phone calls, or other meetings where the relevant parties are not present will not count. The resolution sour
analyzed by heuristicOn June 22, the first round of U.S.-Iran diplomatic talks in Switzerland concluded, with mediators reporting progress toward a roadmap for a final deal and follow-on technical talks expected to continue.(see: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/22/us-iran-agree-on-roadmap-towards-final-deal-in-switzerland-talks). This market will resolve to “Yes” if the next formal senior-level round of peace talks between representatives of the United States and Iran begins by the listed date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying round must be a deliberate in-person diplomatic meeting or negotiating round concerning US-Iran relations, involving senior representatives of both the United States and Iran who are acting in an official capacity and are authorized to conduct or materially direct diplomacy on behalf of their governments. Indirect in-person diplomacy through designated mediators, facilitators, or interlocutors will qualify, provided senior representatives of both the United States and Iran are participating in the same formal diplomatic process with the knowledge and authorization of their respective governments. The representatives need not be in the same room at the same time. Follow-on technical talks from the June 22 Switzerland round will not qualify by themselves. Technical, staff-level, working-group, implementation, monitoring, preparatory, or deconfliction meetings will not qualify unless they occur as part of a new formally convened senior-level U.S.-Iran peace-talks round. Brief greetings, chance encounters, photo opportunities, ceremonial appearances, or talks not deliberately aimed at diplomacy or negotiation will not count. The meeting must be in-person (including indirect in-person meetings) and must be publicly acknowledged by either government or reported by a consensus of credible media. Remote meetings, phone calls, or other meetings where the relevant parties are not present will not count. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments of the United States and Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting.
- Vague threshold Qualitative threshold language — reasonable people can disagree on what clears it.
Paper position only. No real-money execution
| 0.20 |
| — |
| — |
| Whether the same event is priced differently on another venue. A gap may signal an opportunity or a structural difference. |
| 7-day price momentum | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor was not available for this market. | 0.35 | — | — | 7-day drift in the market's own implied probability. Sustained directional moves carry information. |
| BTC/ETH 7-day momentum | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to crypto markets only. | 0.20 | — | — | 7-day Bitcoin or Ethereum return, normalized. Applied to crypto-category markets only. |
| Rate surprise | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.25 | — | — | 2-year Treasury yield reaction in the 48 hours after the most recent scheduled release — a proxy for how markets interpreted the data versus expectations. |
| Yield curve shift | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.15 | — | — | 30-day change in the 10-year minus 2-year Treasury spread. A flattening curve signals tightening expectations; steepening signals easing. |
| News signal | —This factor was not available for this market. No news signal available for this market in the past 14 days. | 0.25 | — | — | Reliability-weighted direction of relevant news from the past 14 days. Official sources (filings, agency statements) carry more weight than commentary. |
| Crowd forecast | —This factor was not available for this market. Insufficient forecasters to compute crowd signal. Requires at least 5 calibration-weighted estimates. | 0.20 | — | — | Calibration-weighted average of user probability estimates. Only applied when 5 or more weighted forecasters have submitted estimates. |
| Model probability | 62.6% | Prior: 63% · Market: 51.5% | |||
| Confidence (λ)Confidence λ (lambda) controls how much weight to give the model vs. the market. Formula: p_final = λ·p_model + (1−λ)·p_market. λ is derived from data quality, factor agreement, and liquidity. When inputs are weak, the model shrinks toward the market — not toward 50%. | 0.82 | Final: 60.6% = λ·model + (1−λ)·market | |||
Resolves Wed, 30 Sep 2026 23:59:00 GMT. The contract pays on these exact criteria, not on the thesis.
Since the first stored model read on 2026-08-02, the market has moved from 65.5% to 51.5%.
This is a directional diagnostic for unresolved markets, not final performance. Resolved outcomes still determine the official live record.
Missing: Cross-market divergence, 7-day price momentum, News signal, Crowd forecast
When features are unavailable, the model increases uncertainty and weights the final estimate closer to the market price. Lower data quality does not mean the market is wrong. It means the model is being appropriately humble.
| Inverse liquidity | 17 | |
| Price volatility | 38 | |
| Resolution proximity | 0 | |
| Data quality | 6 | |
| Category base risk | 80 | |
| Resolution ambiguity | 26 | |
| Regulatory exposure | 0 | |
| Portfolio concentration | 0 |
Composite score 30/100, higher = riskier.
| Market | Mkt | Delta |
|---|---|---|
| Category context | ||
| US x Iran diplomatic meeting by July 31, 2026? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.1% | -- |
| Will Iran announce withdrawal from MOU negotiations by July 31? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.3% | -- |
| US announces end of Iranian blockade by July 31, 2026? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.4% | -- |
| Will Donald Trump publicly insult Vladimir Putin by July 31, 2026? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.7% | -- |
| Iran full airspace closure by July 31? category context: same category + wording overlap | 2.3% | -- |
Divergences > 5pt flagged in amber. For cross-venue pricing, see the Scanner.