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Market 1.7% against model 19.1%. Resolves in 20d 6h, data updated 1d ago.
Decision layer
The model disagreement survives the current gates. This is still research context, not financial advice.
Expected value after costs, not raw probability spread.
How much support the model sees across available inputs.
Thin markets can erase apparent edge through spread and slippage.
Resolution ambiguity, timing, and data quality pressure the decision.
Why / why not trade
This public box mirrors the internal diagnostic style without exposing execution controls: decision, probability gap, cost-adjusted edge, blocker, and next thing to monitor.
side YES
19.1% model / 1.7% market
fees, spread, slippage, risk
Model edge survives the current public research gates.
Watch whether the market price moves toward or away from the model.
Model 19.1% vs market 1.7%.
Raw disagreement is reduced by fees, spread, slippage, and risk controls.
Model leans YES
The model-market gap currently survives the decision gates, but it is still research context and must be judged against the public track record.
Sign in to return to this exact question, review governed evidence, and record an append-only probability without exposing private thesis text.
usable feature coverage.
Volume $3,890,854
The model estimates a 17-point higher probability than the market, primarily driven by historical base rate.
| FACTOR | SIGNAL | WEIGHT | LOG-ODDS ΔLog-odds contribution measures how much each factor shifted the model's probability estimate in log-odds space — the mathematically correct way to stack independent evidence. Formula: Δlog-odds = weight × signal. Positive values push the probability up; negative values push it down. Log-odds are converted back to probability via the logistic function at the end. | DIRECTION | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Historical base rate | 22% | — | −1.265 | Bearish | Historical frequency for this kind of event — the prior before any market-specific evidence. |
| Cross-market divergence | This factor was not available for this market. No approved cross-venue link exists for this market. |
No comparable events matched for this market.
On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics. This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures. If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including: (i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument. A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must: (i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by th
analyzed by heuristicOn June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics. This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures. If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including: (i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument. A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must: (i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting; (ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify. The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify: (i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument; (ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation; (iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks. A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify. Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an inst
Paper position only. No real-money execution
| 0.20 |
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| Whether the same event is priced differently on another venue. A gap may signal an opportunity or a structural difference. |
| 7-day price momentum | +0.02 | 0.35 | +0.006 | Neutral | 7-day drift of the market's own implied probability — sustained moves carry information. |
| BTC/ETH 7-day momentum | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to crypto markets only. | 0.20 | — | — | 7-day Bitcoin or Ethereum return, normalized. Applied to crypto-category markets only. |
| Rate surprise | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.25 | — | — | 2-year Treasury yield reaction in the 48 hours after the most recent scheduled release — a proxy for how markets interpreted the data versus expectations. |
| Yield curve shift | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.15 | — | — | 30-day change in the 10-year minus 2-year Treasury spread. A flattening curve signals tightening expectations; steepening signals easing. |
| News signal | —This factor was not available for this market. No news signal available for this market in the past 14 days. | 0.25 | — | — | Reliability-weighted direction of relevant news from the past 14 days. Official sources (filings, agency statements) carry more weight than commentary. |
| Crowd forecast | —This factor was not available for this market. Insufficient forecasters to compute crowd signal. Requires at least 5 calibration-weighted estimates. | 0.20 | — | — | Calibration-weighted average of user probability estimates. Only applied when 5 or more weighted forecasters have submitted estimates. |
| Model probability | 22.1% | Prior: 22% · Market: 1.7% | |||
| Confidence (λ)Confidence λ (lambda) controls how much weight to give the model vs. the market. Formula: p_final = λ·p_model + (1−λ)·p_market. λ is derived from data quality, factor agreement, and liquidity. When inputs are weak, the model shrinks toward the market — not toward 50%. | 0.85 | Final: 19.1% = λ·model + (1−λ)·market | |||
Resolves Mon, 31 Aug 2026 23:59:00 GMT. The contract pays on these exact criteria, not on the thesis.
Since the first stored model read on 2026-07-31, the market has moved from 3.4% to 1.7%.
This is a directional diagnostic for unresolved markets, not final performance. Resolved outcomes still determine the official live record.
Missing: Cross-market divergence, News signal, Crowd forecast
When features are unavailable, the model increases uncertainty and weights the final estimate closer to the market price. Lower data quality does not mean the market is wrong. It means the model is being appropriately humble.
| Inverse liquidity | 8 | |
| Price volatility | 2 | |
| Resolution proximity | 0 | |
| Data quality | 22 | |
| Category base risk | 80 | |
| Resolution ambiguity | 28 | |
| Regulatory exposure | 0 | |
| Portfolio concentration | 0 |
Composite score 22/100, higher = riskier.
| Market | Mkt | Delta |
|---|---|---|
| Category context | ||
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 2? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.9% | -23pt |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 3? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.9% | -27pt |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through July 31? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.5% | -- |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 1? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.5% | -- |
| Will China invades Taiwan before GTA VI? category context: same category + wording overlap | 50.5% | -0pt |
Divergences > 5pt flagged in amber. For cross-venue pricing, see the Scanner.