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Market 58.5% against model 54.0%. Resolves in 24d 7h, data updated 8d ago.
The model can still be informative here, but one or more gates blocks a trade call.
Decision layer
The model may still be informative, but at least one gate blocks an action-style signal.
Expected value after costs, not raw probability spread.
How much support the model sees across available inputs.
Thin markets can erase apparent edge through spread and slippage.
Resolution ambiguity, timing, and data quality pressure the decision.
usable feature coverage.
Why / why not trade
This public box mirrors the internal diagnostic style without exposing execution controls: decision, probability gap, cost-adjusted edge, blocker, and next thing to monitor.
no side selected
54.0% model / 58.5% market
fees, spread, slippage, risk
No edge after fees and slippage — the market price is fair within costs.
No edge after fees and slippage — the market price is fair within costs.
Model 54.0% vs market 58.5%.
Raw disagreement is reduced by fees, spread, slippage, and risk controls.
No trade
The model may disagree with price, but the gates say the disagreement is not actionable right now.
Sign in to return to this exact question, review governed evidence, and record an append-only probability without exposing private thesis text.
Volume $125,961
Declining to trade is a feature: most markets are priced fairly within costs, and the risk gates run before any edge is considered.
The model estimates a 5-point lower probability than the market, primarily driven by historical base rate.
| FACTOR | SIGNAL | WEIGHT | LOG-ODDS ΔLog-odds contribution measures how much each factor shifted the model's probability estimate in log-odds space — the mathematically correct way to stack independent evidence. Formula: Δlog-odds = weight × signal. Positive values push the probability up; negative values push it down. Log-odds are converted back to probability via the logistic function at the end. | DIRECTION | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Historical base rate | 53% | — | +0.132 | Bullish | Historical frequency for this kind of event — the prior before any market-specific evidence. |
No comparable events matched for this market.
Legislative elections are expected to be held in Israel on October 27, 2026. This market will resolve according to the political party or coalition that wins the greatest number of seats in the Israeli Knesset as a result of this election. If the results of this election are not definitively known by June 30, 2027, 11:59 PM ET, this market will resolve to "Other". In the event of a tie between multiple parties or coalitions for the most seats won, this market will resolve in favor of the party or coalition whose candidate list received a greater number of valid votes. In the event that results in a tie, this market will resolve in favor of the party whose listed name appears first in alphabetical order. This market's resolution will be based solely on the number of seats won by the named party or coalition in the Israeli Knesset. This market will resolve based on the election results, as indicated by a consensus of credible reporting. If there is ambiguity, this market will resolve based solely on the official results as reported by Israel’s Central Election Committee (Va'adet HaBehirot HaMerkazit) (https://www.gov.il/en/departments/central-elections-committee/govil-landing-page). The following rules govern the merging, joint contention, and splitting of listed parties: - If Likud or Together (or any successor party created through a merger) merge with or contest the election jointly with any other party, the option corresponding to Likud or Together will represent the resultant candidate list or merged party. Otherwise: - If a listed party merges with, or contests the election as part of a joint candidate list with, one or more unlisted parties prior to the election, the option corresponding to the listed party will represent all seats won by the merged party or joint candidate list. If a listed party merges with, or contests the election as part of a joint candidate list with, one or more other listed parties prior to the election, the option correspondi
ambiguity 40/100analyzed by heuristicLegislative elections are expected to be held in Israel on October 27, 2026. This market will resolve according to the political party or coalition that wins the greatest number of seats in the Israeli Knesset as a result of this election. If the results of this election are not definitively known by June 30, 2027, 11:59 PM ET, this market will resolve to "Other". In the event of a tie between multiple parties or coalitions for the most seats won, this market will resolve in favor of the party or coalition whose candidate list received a greater number of valid votes. In the event that results in a tie, this market will resolve in favor of the party whose listed name appears first in alphabetical order. This market's resolution will be based solely on the number of seats won by the named party or coalition in the Israeli Knesset. This market will resolve based on the election results, as indicated by a consensus of credible reporting. If there is ambiguity, this market will resolve based solely on the official results as reported by Israel’s Central Election Committee (Va'adet HaBehirot HaMerkazit) (https://www.gov.il/en/departments/central-elections-committee/govil-landing-page). The following rules govern the merging, joint contention, and splitting of listed parties: - If Likud or Together (or any successor party created through a merger) merge with or contest the election jointly with any other party, the option corresponding to Likud or Together will represent the resultant candidate list or merged party. Otherwise: - If a listed party merges with, or contests the election as part of a joint candidate list with, one or more unlisted parties prior to the election, the option corresponding to the listed party will represent all seats won by the merged party or joint candidate list. If a listed party merges with, or contests the election as part of a joint candidate list with, one or more other listed parties prior to the election, the option corresponding to the party which held the most seats in the prior Knesset will represent all seats won by the merged party/joint candidate list. If these rules do not adequately determine which option represents a merged party or joint candidate list, the listed party whose name, as listed in this market, comes first in alphabetical order, will represent all seats won by the merged party or joint candidate list. - If a listed party splits into multiple parties prior to the election, the option corresponding to the listed party will represent the resulting party that holds the greatest number of seats in the Israeli Knesset as a result of the split. If these rules do not adequately determine which party represents a listed option after a split, the listed option will represent all seats won by the party resulting from the split whose primary English name comes first in alphabetical order.
The engine sizes NO TRADE markets to zero. Sizing never overrides the risk gates.
Paper position only. No real-money execution
| 0.00 |
| 0.20 |
| 0.000 |
| Neutral |
| Linked venue pricing the same event higher/lower (V2 scanner); 0 without an approved link. |
| Recent price momentum | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.000 | Neutral | 7-day drift of the market's own implied probability — sustained moves carry information. |
| BTC/ETH 7-day momentum | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to crypto markets only. | 0.20 | — | — | 7-day Bitcoin or Ethereum return, normalized. Applied to crypto-category markets only. |
| Rate surprise | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.25 | — | — | 2-year Treasury yield reaction in the 48 hours after the most recent scheduled release — a proxy for how markets interpreted the data versus expectations. |
| Yield curve shift | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.15 | — | — | 30-day change in the 10-year minus 2-year Treasury spread. A flattening curve signals tightening expectations; steepening signals easing. |
| News signal | —This factor was not available for this market. No news signal available for this market in the past 14 days. | 0.25 | — | — | Reliability-weighted direction of relevant news from the past 14 days. Official sources (filings, agency statements) carry more weight than commentary. |
| Crowd forecast | —This factor was not available for this market. Insufficient forecasters to compute crowd signal. Requires at least 5 calibration-weighted estimates. | 0.20 | — | — | Calibration-weighted average of user probability estimates. Only applied when 5 or more weighted forecasters have submitted estimates. |
| Model probability | 53.3% | Prior: 53% · Market: 58.5% | |||
| Confidence (λ)Confidence λ (lambda) controls how much weight to give the model vs. the market. Formula: p_final = λ·p_model + (1−λ)·p_market. λ is derived from data quality, factor agreement, and liquidity. When inputs are weak, the model shrinks toward the market — not toward 50%. | 0.87 | Final: 54.0% = λ·model + (1−λ)·market | |||
Resolves Wed, 28 Oct 2026 03:59:00 GMT. The contract pays on these exact criteria, not on the thesis.
Since the first stored model read on 2026-09-25, the market has moved from 55.5% to 58.5%.
This is a directional diagnostic for unresolved markets, not final performance. Resolved outcomes still determine the official live record.
Missing: News signal, Crowd forecast
When features are unavailable, the model increases uncertainty and weights the final estimate closer to the market price. Lower data quality does not mean the market is wrong. It means the model is being appropriately humble.
| Inverse liquidity | 18 | |
| Price volatility | 10 | |
| Resolution proximity | 0 | |
| Data quality | 51 | |
| Category base risk | 55 | |
| Resolution ambiguity | 40 | |
| Regulatory exposure | 0 | |
| Portfolio concentration | 0 |
Composite score 21/100, higher = riskier.
| Market | Mkt | Delta |
|---|---|---|
| Category context | ||
| Will Eduardo Bolsonaro win the 2026 Brazilian presidential election? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.1% | -- |
| Will Eduardo Leite win the 2026 Brazilian presidential election? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.1% | -- |
| Will Aldo Rebelo win the 2026 Brazilian presidential election? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.1% | -- |
| Will Michelle Bolsonaro win the 2026 Brazilian presidential election? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.1% | -- |
| Will Pablo Marçal win the 2026 Brazilian presidential election? category context: same category + wording overlap | 0.1% | +18pt |
Divergences > 5pt flagged in amber. For cross-venue pricing, see the Scanner.