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Market 7.0% against model 29.1%. Resolves in 19d 4h, data updated 2d ago.
Decision layer
The model disagreement survives the current gates. This is still research context, not financial advice.
Expected value after costs, not raw probability spread.
How much support the model sees across available inputs.
Thin markets can erase apparent edge through spread and slippage.
Resolution ambiguity, timing, and data quality pressure the decision.
Why / why not trade
This public box mirrors the internal diagnostic style without exposing execution controls: decision, probability gap, cost-adjusted edge, blocker, and next thing to monitor.
side YES
29.1% model / 7.0% market
fees, spread, slippage, risk
Model edge survives the current public research gates.
Watch whether the market price moves toward or away from the model.
Model 29.1% vs market 7.0%.
Raw disagreement is reduced by fees, spread, slippage, and risk controls.
Model leans YES
The model-market gap currently survives the decision gates, but it is still research context and must be judged against the public track record.
Sign in to return to this exact question, review governed evidence, and record an append-only probability without exposing private thesis text.
usable feature coverage.
Volume $750,929
The model estimates a 22-point higher probability than the market, primarily driven by historical base rate.
| FACTOR | SIGNAL | WEIGHT | LOG-ODDS ΔLog-odds contribution measures how much each factor shifted the model's probability estimate in log-odds space — the mathematically correct way to stack independent evidence. Formula: Δlog-odds = weight × signal. Positive values push the probability up; negative values push it down. Log-odds are converted back to probability via the logistic function at the end. | DIRECTION | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Historical base rate | 34% | — | −0.686 | Bearish | Historical frequency for this kind of event — the prior before any market-specific evidence. |
| Cross-market divergence | 0.00 | 0.20 |
No comparable events matched for this market.
This market resolves to “Yes” if the Iranian government officially announces and begins collecting fees, tolls, charges, tariffs, or similar payments from commercial vessels which are mandatory for passage through or access to the Strait of Hormuz between market creation and the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” A qualifying fee must be an announced policy which applies generally to all commercial vessels, or a defined subcategory of commercial vessels (e.g., vessels flagged to the US and its allies). Isolated demanded charges will not qualify. A fee is mandatory if, in practice, affected commercial vessels cannot transit or access the Strait of Hormuz without paying it, regardless of whether Iran characterizes the payment as voluntary or a fee for services. Fees described as tolls, maritime fees, service charges, environmental fees, security fees, insurance charges, etc. will qualify provided they are recognized as mandatory for passage through or access to the Strait of Hormuz by a consensus of credible reporting (e.g., a mandatory insurance fee charged by the Iranian Persian Gulf Strait Authority would qualify). Both of the following are required to occur prior to the specified date, 11:59 PM ET to satisfy this market’s resolution criteria: 1) An official announcement from the Iranian government that such a fee is being, or will be, implemented. 2) A consensus of credible reporting that collection of the fee has begun. Fees charged by Oman, the United Arab Emirates, shipping insurers, private companies, or other non-Iranian entities do not qualify unless charged jointly with Iran, or if Iran directly receives the fee or controls the charging entity. Normal port fees, customs duties, sanctions-related costs, or shipping surcharges do not alone qualify. The resolution sources will be official announcements from the government of Iran and consensus of credible reporting.
analyzed by heuristicThis market resolves to “Yes” if the Iranian government officially announces and begins collecting fees, tolls, charges, tariffs, or similar payments from commercial vessels which are mandatory for passage through or access to the Strait of Hormuz between market creation and the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” A qualifying fee must be an announced policy which applies generally to all commercial vessels, or a defined subcategory of commercial vessels (e.g., vessels flagged to the US and its allies). Isolated demanded charges will not qualify. A fee is mandatory if, in practice, affected commercial vessels cannot transit or access the Strait of Hormuz without paying it, regardless of whether Iran characterizes the payment as voluntary or a fee for services. Fees described as tolls, maritime fees, service charges, environmental fees, security fees, insurance charges, etc. will qualify provided they are recognized as mandatory for passage through or access to the Strait of Hormuz by a consensus of credible reporting (e.g., a mandatory insurance fee charged by the Iranian Persian Gulf Strait Authority would qualify). Both of the following are required to occur prior to the specified date, 11:59 PM ET to satisfy this market’s resolution criteria: 1) An official announcement from the Iranian government that such a fee is being, or will be, implemented. 2) A consensus of credible reporting that collection of the fee has begun. Fees charged by Oman, the United Arab Emirates, shipping insurers, private companies, or other non-Iranian entities do not qualify unless charged jointly with Iran, or if Iran directly receives the fee or controls the charging entity. Normal port fees, customs duties, sanctions-related costs, or shipping surcharges do not alone qualify. The resolution sources will be official announcements from the government of Iran and consensus of credible reporting.
Resolves Mon, 31 Aug 2026 23:59:00 GMT. The contract pays on these exact criteria, not on the thesis.
Paper position only. No real-money execution
| 0.000 |
| Neutral |
| Linked venue pricing the same event higher/lower (V2 scanner); 0 without an approved link. |
| 7-day price momentum | −0.10 | 0.35 | −0.035 | Neutral | 7-day drift of the market's own implied probability — sustained moves carry information. |
| BTC/ETH 7-day momentum | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to crypto markets only. | 0.20 | — | — | 7-day Bitcoin or Ethereum return, normalized. Applied to crypto-category markets only. |
| Rate surprise | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.25 | — | — | 2-year Treasury yield reaction in the 48 hours after the most recent scheduled release — a proxy for how markets interpreted the data versus expectations. |
| Yield curve shift | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.15 | — | — | 30-day change in the 10-year minus 2-year Treasury spread. A flattening curve signals tightening expectations; steepening signals easing. |
| News signal | —This factor was not available for this market. No news signal available for this market in the past 14 days. | 0.25 | — | — | Reliability-weighted direction of relevant news from the past 14 days. Official sources (filings, agency statements) carry more weight than commentary. |
| Crowd forecast | —This factor was not available for this market. Insufficient forecasters to compute crowd signal. Requires at least 5 calibration-weighted estimates. | 0.20 | — | — | Calibration-weighted average of user probability estimates. Only applied when 5 or more weighted forecasters have submitted estimates. |
| Model probability | 32.7% | Prior: 34% · Market: 8.0% | |||
| Confidence (λ)Confidence λ (lambda) controls how much weight to give the model vs. the market. Formula: p_final = λ·p_model + (1−λ)·p_market. λ is derived from data quality, factor agreement, and liquidity. When inputs are weak, the model shrinks toward the market — not toward 50%. | 0.85 | Final: 29.1% = λ·model + (1−λ)·market | |||
Since the first stored model read on 2026-08-02, the market has moved from 22.5% to 7.0%.
This is a directional diagnostic for unresolved markets, not final performance. Resolved outcomes still determine the official live record.
Missing: News signal, Crowd forecast
When features are unavailable, the model increases uncertainty and weights the final estimate closer to the market price. Lower data quality does not mean the market is wrong. It means the model is being appropriately humble.
| Inverse liquidity | 24 | |
| Price volatility | 21 | |
| Resolution proximity | 0 | |
| Data quality | 52 | |
| Category base risk | 80 | |
| Resolution ambiguity | 8 | |
| Regulatory exposure | 0 | |
| Portfolio concentration | 0 |
Composite score 24/100, higher = riskier.
| Market | Mkt | Delta |
|---|---|---|
| Category context | ||
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 2? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.9% | -23pt |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 3? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.9% | -27pt |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through July 31? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.5% | -- |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 1? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.5% | -- |
| Will China invades Taiwan before GTA VI? category context: same category + wording overlap | 50.5% | -0pt |
Divergences > 5pt flagged in amber. For cross-venue pricing, see the Scanner.