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Market 14.5% against model 22.5%. Resolves in 18d 3h, data updated 12d ago.
Decision layer
The market is worth monitoring, but the current edge or evidence does not justify an actionable label.
Expected value after costs, not raw probability spread.
How much support the model sees across available inputs.
Thin markets can erase apparent edge through spread and slippage.
Resolution ambiguity, timing, and data quality pressure the decision.
Why / why not trade
This public box mirrors the internal diagnostic style without exposing execution controls: decision, probability gap, cost-adjusted edge, blocker, and next thing to monitor.
side YES
22.5% model / 14.5% market
fees, spread, slippage, risk
Interesting disagreement, but the full action threshold is not met.
Watch for a tighter spread or deeper order book.
Model 22.5% vs market 14.5%.
Raw disagreement is reduced by fees, spread, slippage, and risk controls.
Watch, do not force it
The market is directionally interesting, but at least one evidence, edge, liquidity, or risk condition is not strong enough.
Sign in to return to this exact question, review governed evidence, and record an append-only probability without exposing private thesis text.
usable feature coverage.
Volume $37,525
The model estimates a 8-point higher probability than the market, primarily driven by historical base rate.
| FACTOR | SIGNAL | WEIGHT | LOG-ODDS ΔLog-odds contribution measures how much each factor shifted the model's probability estimate in log-odds space — the mathematically correct way to stack independent evidence. Formula: Δlog-odds = weight × signal. Positive values push the probability up; negative values push it down. Log-odds are converted back to probability via the logistic function at the end. | DIRECTION | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Historical base rate | 25% | — | −1.093 | Bearish | Historical frequency for this kind of event — the prior before any market-specific evidence. |
| Cross-market divergence | —This factor was not available for this market. No approved cross-venue link exists for this market. | 0.20 | — | — | Whether the same event is priced differently on another venue. A gap may signal an opportunity or a structural difference. |
| 7-day price momentum | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor was not available for this market. |
No comparable events matched for this market.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if participation by Israeli military personnel in a ground operation in Iran on or after February 28, 2026, is confirmed by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. A "ground operation" is defined as a military operation that involves Israeli military ground forces conducting operations within Iranian territory. For the purposes of this market, aerial and maritime operations will not be considered. Only operations involving Israeli troops on the ground within the terrestrial territory of Iran will qualify. Official confirmation by the Israeli military of personnel operating on the ground within Iranian territory during the specified timeframe will resolve this market immediately. An overwhelming consensus of credible reporting confirming that the Israeli military personnel operated on the ground within Iranian territory during the specified timeframe will also suffice. Qualifying confirmations include statements such as the June 25, 2025, statement by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir confirmed that Israeli commando forces operated covertly on the ground inside Iran during the 12-day war. Confirmations referring only to non-military Israeli intelligence activity, including operations by the Mossad or Shin Bet, as well as airstrikes, cyberattacks, standoff weapons, remote sabotage, or actions by proxies or third parties without Israeli military presence, will not alone qualify. Incidents that would not alone suffice include the November 2025 Mossad statement indicating its agents were present during protests in Iran, or the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, widely attributed to Mossad agents. The primary resolution source for this market will be official information by the Israeli military; however, an overwhelming consensus of credible reporting will also suffice.
analyzed by heuristicThis market will resolve to "Yes" if participation by Israeli military personnel in a ground operation in Iran on or after February 28, 2026, is confirmed by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. A "ground operation" is defined as a military operation that involves Israeli military ground forces conducting operations within Iranian territory. For the purposes of this market, aerial and maritime operations will not be considered. Only operations involving Israeli troops on the ground within the terrestrial territory of Iran will qualify. Official confirmation by the Israeli military of personnel operating on the ground within Iranian territory during the specified timeframe will resolve this market immediately. An overwhelming consensus of credible reporting confirming that the Israeli military personnel operated on the ground within Iranian territory during the specified timeframe will also suffice. Qualifying confirmations include statements such as the June 25, 2025, statement by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir confirmed that Israeli commando forces operated covertly on the ground inside Iran during the 12-day war. Confirmations referring only to non-military Israeli intelligence activity, including operations by the Mossad or Shin Bet, as well as airstrikes, cyberattacks, standoff weapons, remote sabotage, or actions by proxies or third parties without Israeli military presence, will not alone qualify. Incidents that would not alone suffice include the November 2025 Mossad statement indicating its agents were present during protests in Iran, or the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, widely attributed to Mossad agents. The primary resolution source for this market will be official information by the Israeli military; however, an overwhelming consensus of credible reporting will also suffice.
Resolves Mon, 31 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT. The contract pays on these exact criteria, not on the thesis.
Paper position only. No real-money execution
| 0.35 |
| — |
| — |
| 7-day drift in the market's own implied probability. Sustained directional moves carry information. |
| BTC/ETH 7-day momentum | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to crypto markets only. | 0.20 | — | — | 7-day Bitcoin or Ethereum return, normalized. Applied to crypto-category markets only. |
| Rate surprise | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.25 | — | — | 2-year Treasury yield reaction in the 48 hours after the most recent scheduled release — a proxy for how markets interpreted the data versus expectations. |
| Yield curve shift | —This factor was not available for this market. This factor applies to Fed, CPI, and macro markets only. | 0.15 | — | — | 30-day change in the 10-year minus 2-year Treasury spread. A flattening curve signals tightening expectations; steepening signals easing. |
| News signal | —This factor was not available for this market. No news signal available for this market in the past 14 days. | 0.25 | — | — | Reliability-weighted direction of relevant news from the past 14 days. Official sources (filings, agency statements) carry more weight than commentary. |
| Crowd forecast | —This factor was not available for this market. Insufficient forecasters to compute crowd signal. Requires at least 5 calibration-weighted estimates. | 0.20 | — | — | Calibration-weighted average of user probability estimates. Only applied when 5 or more weighted forecasters have submitted estimates. |
| Model probability | 25.1% | Prior: 25% · Market: 14.5% | |||
| Confidence (λ)Confidence λ (lambda) controls how much weight to give the model vs. the market. Formula: p_final = λ·p_model + (1−λ)·p_market. λ is derived from data quality, factor agreement, and liquidity. When inputs are weak, the model shrinks toward the market — not toward 50%. | 0.75 | Final: 22.5% = λ·model + (1−λ)·market | |||
Since the first stored model read on 2026-07-31, the market has moved from 8.5% to 14.5%.
This is a directional diagnostic for unresolved markets, not final performance. Resolved outcomes still determine the official live record.
Missing: Cross-market divergence, 7-day price momentum, News signal, Crowd forecast
When features are unavailable, the model increases uncertainty and weights the final estimate closer to the market price. Lower data quality does not mean the market is wrong. It means the model is being appropriately humble.
| Inverse liquidity | 48 | |
| Price volatility | 61 | |
| Resolution proximity | 0 | |
| Data quality | 24 | |
| Category base risk | 80 | |
| Resolution ambiguity | 8 | |
| Regulatory exposure | 0 | |
| Portfolio concentration | 0 |
Composite score 37/100, higher = riskier.
| Market | Mkt | Delta |
|---|---|---|
| Category context | ||
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 2? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.9% | -23pt |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 3? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.9% | -27pt |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through July 31? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.5% | -- |
| Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through August 1? category context: same category + wording overlap | 99.5% | -- |
| Will China invades Taiwan before GTA VI? category context: same category + wording overlap | 50.5% | -0pt |
Divergences > 5pt flagged in amber. For cross-venue pricing, see the Scanner.